Human Rights Brief
Volume 16

Issue 2

Article 4

2009

International Justice Marks Its Fifteenth Anniversary: A
Preliminary Assessment of the ICTY’s Impact in Serbia
Diane Orentlicher
American University Washington College of Law, orentlic@wcl.american.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Orentlicher, Diane. "International Justice Marks Its Fifteenth Anniversary: A Preliminary Assessment of the
ICTY’s Impact in Serbia." Human Rights Brief 16, no. 2 (2009): 19-21.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews
at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Human Rights Brief by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law.
For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.

International Justice Marks Its Fifteenth Anniversary:
A Preliminary Assessment of the ICTY’s Impact in Serbia1
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By Diane Orentlicher*

December 14, 1996 signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Paris, ending the war in the former Yugoslavia.

F

ifteen years ago, the UN Security Council responded
to devastating violence in the Balkans by taking novel
action: it created a war crimes court as an enforcement
measure under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.2 At the time,
many saw the Council’s action as a cynical gesture, aimed at
placating public demand for more assertive action to halt the
carnage then in full rage in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Few, if any,
believed that the Council’s ad hoc innovation would become
precedent for future action.
Yet despite its inauspicious beginning, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) launched
a new era in international law and institutions. What had long
seemed implausible—a revival of Nuremberg-type tribunals—
soon became a normal though hardly routine response to
mass atrocities. A year and a half after it created the ICTY,
the Security Council created a similar court to provide some
measure of justice for those who survived the 1994 genocide in
Rwanda.3 Since then, the UN has played a key role in creating—
sometimes together with a host State—courts empowered to
address notorious crimes committed in Sierra Leone, Timor
Leste, Kosovo, Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon.
By the time a permanent international criminal court began
its legal life in 2002, the institutionalization of global justice
seemed more inevitable than remarkable.

The proliferation and lengthening life of contemporary tribunals has spawned robust debate about their accomplishments.
Citing their substantial costs, critics charge that war crimes tribunals have accomplished comparatively little and may even at
times stand in the way of progress in areas as urgently important
as securing a peaceful end to conflict or a stable foundation for
social reconstruction. Proponents acknowledge that international tribunals have hardly operated in a flawless fashion and
are quick to note that expectations for such courts should be kept
within reasonable bounds. Yet, they argue, these bodies have
helped dispel impunity for vicious crimes, deepened jurisprudence concerning international humanitarian law and, perhaps
most important, honored and partially redeemed victims’ suffering for crimes that should never have been permitted to sweep
unchecked.
While views on all sides have evinced deep conviction, they
have rarely been grounded in empirical evidence. In this setting,
and with the fifteenth anniversary of the ICTY then looming on
the near horizon, I devoted a recent sabbatical year to studying
the ICTY’s impact on the ground in countries most directly
affected by its work.4 In May 2008, on the fifteenth anniversary
of the ICTY’s creation, the Open Society Justice Initiative published the first tranche of this research in a report, Shrinking the
Space for Denial: The Impact of the ICTY in Serbia (“Shrinking
the Space for Denial”).
The report identified tangible impacts—these include, of
course, the incapacitation of indicted war criminals, such as
former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević—while trying
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to capture the unquantifiable but consequential significance of
these and other ICTY-related developments for Serbian society,
both positive and negative. In brief, the study identified several
key categories of impact—a concept whose meaning for purposes of the report was informed in part by the views of Serbian
citizens.5

Srebrenica, Bosnia and Hercegovina – City Center.

social norms and institutions that form a crucial bulwark against
a return to the violence of the 1990s.
Many Serbians are convinced that, without the ICTY, there
would have been wholesale impunity for 1990s era atrocities
committed by, or with the indispensable support of, Serbian
leaders. In the words of Serbian journalist Filip Svarm, “It’s
simple. If not for the Hague Tribunal, no one would ever actually bring to trial anyone who committed these crimes.”7 “The
message,” Serbian human rights lawyer (and WCL alumnus)
Bogdan Ivanišević believes, would have been that “one can do
whatever he wants to do because he’s in power and that’s it.
That kind of message would be disastrous. The ICTY prevented
that from happening.”8 Instead of allowing wholesale impunity,
another Serbian activist told me, the ICTY demonstrated that
“there is no one who can order killings and stay unpunished.”9

Deterrence vs. Prevention:
Dispelling Impunity
Tribunal skeptics charge that the ICTY has failed to achieve
one of its core aims—to deter further atrocities. As has often
been noted, the worst atrocity in Europe since the Holocaust,
the 1995 genocide in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica,6 occurred
after the ICTY had begun operating. Nor did the ICTY prevent
Serbian atrocities in Kosovo, which prompted a 1999 military
intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
But if the ICTY failed to deter these crimes, this does not
close the book on the question whether or to what extent a more
fully functioning international tribunal can deter crimes (or
even whether the ICTY has deterred some crimes). After all, the
ICTY had managed to secure custody over just one, low-level
suspect by the time the Srebrenica massacre occurred, and its
ability to secure custody of indictees remained problematic at
the time abuses surged in Kosovo. Many are convinced that over
time, as the ICTY has gained custody over most of its indictees,
including senior officials, it has deterred atrocious crimes that
would have been committed but for its existence—a proposition
that by its nature cannot be proved. (Indeed, the study did not
attempt to reach conclusions on this dimension of impact.)
While it is impossible to gauge the extent to which (if any)
the ICTY has deterred criminal conduct, this point should not be
confused with a related question: whether it has served a broader
preventive function. Serbian supporters of the ICTY believe
that, in myriad ways, the Tribunal’s work has strengthened

Impact on the Rule of Law: Domestic
War Crimes Prosecutions
While many Serbians believe that the ICTY’s prosecutions
have themselves gone a long way toward dispelling impunity, a
more tangible contribution—one that is closely bound up with
the Tribunal’s preventive function—has been its role in spurring
the creation of a credible system of domestic war crimes prosecutions. Almost everyone I interviewed in Serbia believes that
the ICTY provided crucial impetus for the creation in 2003 of a
War Crimes Chamber (WCC) in the District Court of Belgrade
and that the ICTY has bolstered that court’s capacity to investigate and prosecute war crimes.
Striking in its own right, this development is the more
remarkable because strengthening domestic legal capacity was
not one of the original goals of the ICTY. To the contrary, a
central premise behind its creation was that courts in the former
Yugoslavia were unable or could not be trusted to bring perpetrators of atrocities to justice.
Space does not permit more than a few, incomplete observations about how this unexpected contribution came to pass
(Shrinking the Space for Denial examines the phenomenon in
some depth). Notably, Serbians see the ICTY’s operation as a
harsh judgment on Serbian justice. Once political conditions in
Serbia made local war crimes prosecutions viable (this develop20
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ment emerged alongside pressures for the ICTY to wind up its
own work in part by transferring some of its cases to domestic
courts), the Serbian War Crimes Prosecutor was keen to demonstrate local competence, as a matter of national and professional
pride. In larger perspective, as the President of the WCC told
me, the ICTY was “the embryo” for his court, providing the
“idea” as well as “know how”.10
Against a protracted period of Serbian hostility toward the
ICTY, it is nothing less than remarkable that the word most
often used to describe the relationship between the ICTY
Prosecutor and his Serbian counterpart is that of “partnership.” Notably, when the ICTY at long last obtained custody
of Radovan Karadžić—one of its most notorious fugitives
from justice—in July 2008, ICTY Prosecutor Serge Brammertz
hailed the achievements of his “colleagues in Belgrade” who
secured custody of Karadžić, including the Serbian War Crimes
Prosecutor.11

Serbians who support the ICTY believe that one of its most
important functions is to foster a fuller reckoning by Serbian
society with past atrocities committed by or at the instigation
of their leaders—and to condemn them unequivocally. Public
opinion surveys suggest that the ICTY’s impact in this regard
has been modest at best. Only half of the respondents surveyed
in December 2006 reported, for example, that they believed
reports that a large number of Muslims had been massacred in
Srebrenica.14
Yet few doubt that evidence introduced in The Hague has,
in the words of Serbian attorney Ivan Janković, significantly
“shrunk the public space” for denying the truth about notorious
crimes committed by Serbs.15 A video of a Serb paramilitary
unit executing six Bosnian Muslim men who were taken from
Srebrenica during the 1995 genocide there, shown during the
trial of Slobodan Milošević, had a galvanizing impact in Serbia.
Repeatedly rebroadcast on Serbian television, the video “ripped
away the veil of secrecy and denial of Serbian military operations in Bosnia,” the Washington Post reported. “No longer was
it possible to label atrocity tales as Bosnian Muslim propaganda
. . . , as many Serbs had done for a decade.”16 Still, as civic
leader Jadranka Jelenčić noted, this knowledge “doesn’t necessarily make people regret” crimes they can no longer credibly
deny.17

Removing Dangerous Individuals
In the view of some Serbians interviewed for my study,
another key dimension of the ICTY’s preventive impact,
broadly defined, is the Tribunal’s role in “physically removing
some of the worst criminals” from the region, which journalist Dejan Anastasijević describes as an important contribution
“that is usually neglected by experts.”12 Some believe that the
ICTY’s prosecution of former President Milošević in particular
facilitated Serbia’s transition to democracy (a process that has
nonetheless been halting and vexed). In the words of an official
of the first post-Milošević administration, the former leader’s
“removal . . . was something that had to be done in order to
make the next step in our democratization process. He would
have been an unbearable burden [if he were tried] in Serbian
jurisdiction.”13

The Work of Generations
Fifteen years after the ICTY’s creation, it is now possible
to take a preliminary measure of its impact. By equal measure,
however, it is far too soon to know its legacy. Scholars of the
Nuremberg Tribunal know that its impact in Germany has
unfolded and evolved across decades. So, too, the impact of the
ICTY will be the work of generations.		
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